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W O J C I E C H  M I C H N I K
In the clash of narratives between Russia and 
NATO states, Moscow has clearly gained an 
upper hand. Russian success stems not only from 
the fact that the Kremlin has been able to send a 
much clearer and more coherent message than 
the Alliance, but also because NATO states do 
not have one narrative, or counter-narrative.
One of the central concerns when analysing international security and its his-
tory is how to explain certain events and their impact on international politics. For 
policy-makers and societies it is crucial to define “who we are” and “what kind of 
world order we want”. The passing decade has been marked by a return to a crisis 
between the West and Russia (sometimes referred to as the New Cold War), with 
conflict over Russian aggression in Ukraine being the most striking example. Yet 
the indirect confrontation between NATO and Russia should be measured not 
only in political disputes, economic calculations and military build-up, but also 
in terms of the competing narratives that have shaped the understanding or mis-
understanding of partners and adversaries alike.
One of the ways that the Kremlin gains political and diplomatic ground in in-
ternational affairs is by putting a wedge between NATO allies, namely, between 
the United States and its European partners. This was quite evident in the recent 
intra-NATO rift over Turkey’s decision to purchase S-400 missile systems from 
Russia and deploy military troops, hand in hand with Russian forces, in Syria last 
October. Simultaneously, even a glance at Europe reveals challenges to its security 
and stability: Ukraine, Libya, Syria, Algeria, Iran, Turkey – to name just a few states 
that lay in the so-called arc of instability, and which are influenced, to a certain 
extent, by the direct policies of the Russian Federation.
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Context is king, but the king is naked
It is a euphemism to claim we live in the world of storytelling. In pre-internet 
times, the victors mostly had a monopoly on telling “the truth”, while those who 
came second or third were forced to tell their story mostly to themselves. This is 
no longer the case. With the rapid development of social media, the rise of popu-
list movements, and rampant disinformation campaigns, states have increasingly 
focused on pushing their narratives to reach domestic and sympathetic global 
audiences. As a result, a contemporary struggle for power, security and influence 
among state and non-state actors alike has increasingly 
been supported with targeting audiences with tailored 
interpretations of events.
There seems to be no better example of diverging 
narratives than ones employed during the latest rift 
within the Euro-Atlantic alliance. To be fair, though, 
some of the actions and official rhetoric from the 
western states made the lives of Russian propaganda 
makers a bit easier. The most famous example of such 
behaviour in 2019 came from the French president, 
Emmanuel Macron. He told The Economist that NATO 
is “brain dead” and “European countries can no longer 
rely on America to protect its allies”. It happened to be 
almost irrelevant that the French leader also touched upon a number of key issues, 
including a clear-eyed and cold-blooded realpolitik analysis of European security 
and transatlantic relations. Or that his assessment that Europe needs to rethink 
its strategic role is accurate, while NATO should reassess its role in contemporary 
security architecture. The damage was done to the already strained transatlantic 
dialogue; and the Kremlin surely enjoyed it.
This is not to single out one particular European leader, as critics of the Alliance 
within NATO itself are plenty (from Donald Trump to Turkey’s Recep Erdoğan). 
Yet Macron’s comments symbolise the growing trend within the transatlantic com-
munity that serves – though unintentionally – Russia’s long-term interest in the 
European realm. Even when Macron is partially right – when he points towards 
American slow disengagement from Europe in order to concentrate on the Asian 
continent – he fails to mention the deployment of US and NATO troops to the 
Eastern flank of the Alliance. In other words, the narrative that he advances tells 
only one side of the story, a side that, according to a common understanding of 
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In this context, the biggest issue with his interview was the part where he doubts 
whether Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (which states that an attack on one 
country is an attack on all) would work, turning his attention to the imperative of 
European defensive autonomy, and finishing with a statement calling for a need 
of reopening a strategic dialogue with Russia. It can be argued that saying those 
things did no good to either transatlantic relations or European fading attempts 
of finding a coherent response to a resurgent Russia.
The sympathisers
There are a few European politicians who have played into Russia’s narratives 
much stronger than Macron. Hungary’s prime minister, Victor Orbán, famous 
for his euroscepticism and departure from the liberal 
democratic path, has not shied away from tightening 
Budapest’s relations with Moscow (even after Rus-
sia’s invasion and annexation of Crimea which was 
unequivocally seen by the West as a flagrant violation 
of basic international norms). Suffice to say that in the 
span of four years (2016 – 2019) Orbán and Vladimir 
Putin met five times, making Hungary one of Russia’s 
closest partners within the NATO and the EU alike. 
In October 2019, the Hungarian leader explained this close relationship through 
the prism of old fashion geopolitics, remarking that “we live in a Berlin-Moscow-
Istanbul triangle”.
In Italy the tradition of pro-Russian sentiment among political circles is also 
strong with Silvio Berlusconi and Matteo Salvini being the most obvious cases. 
Even the pro-western and pro-US prime minister Matteo Renzi (2014 – 2016) at-
tempted to pursue closer economic co-operation between Rome and Moscow. Even 
though his government backed initial sanctions against Moscow after the onset of 
the conflict in Ukraine, Renzi opposed their renewal “and searched for openings to 
bring Russia back into Europe’s security discussions”. It did not help transatlantic 
coherence when Renzi referred to Russia as an indispensable partner for Europe, 
and “praising Putin’s ‘wise approach’ to controversial issues on the global stage, 
such as the Syrian crisis.”
Meanwhile, the diverse European spectrum has produced a number of fringe 
political parties that are openly pro-Russian and pro-Putin; Marie Le Pen’s Na-
tional Rally being one of the examples, followed by UKIP, Podemos, Syriza and 
the Northern League. What seems worrisome from the European perspective, is a 
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reoccurring pro-Kremlin stance of some mainstream European leaders, especially 
since this trend has occurred at a time when Russia’s hostile actions include targeted 
disinformation campaigns, assassinations of western citizens, and anti-western 
propaganda. Yet in order to understand why such a trend might be dangerous for 
NATO’s European members one would need to look at Russia’s official narratives 
that have been used to justify its foreign policy.
From Russia with disinformation
For a casual observer of Russian politics, the narratives behind the Kremlin’s 
foreign policy advanced for the last two decades (not coincidentally equal with 
Vladimir Putin’s reign over Russia) appear to be straightforward and cohesive. 
First, they refer to the status of Russia as an “independent global power” and its 
identity as something that is “historically destined” to remain fully independent 
from the West or China. In 2005 Putin famously called the collapse of the Soviet 
Union a catastrophe, and reinforced his statement in 2018 saying that “he would 
reverse the collapse of the Soviet Union if he had a chance to alter modern Rus-
sian history”. From this perception comes the Kremlin’s (mis)understanding of 
its place in the world, with its core demand to be treated as a global power, equal 
to that of the United States or China. Moscow refuses to be dominated by other 
powers and hegemons.
Second, such a view helps to justify official Russian rhetoric of treating NATO 
as a hostile threat. For the Kremlin, NATO is nothing more than an “American 
puppet” in a grand chess game for “spheres of influences”. This explains Russia’s 
paranoid reaction to the instalment of elements of the US strategic missile defence 
system in Poland and Romania. As Putin claimed in a 2018 interview: “this poses 
a direct threat to our national security. Therefore, the advancement of NATO 
infrastructure towards our borders poses a threat, and our reaction to it will be 
extremely negative.” In 2014, when Russia invaded Crimea, Putin not only justified 
these steps by protecting Russians living there but also said that most of Russia’s 
actions were nothing more than reactions to the West’s menacing and “dishonest” 
policies. “This happened with NATO’s expansion to the East, as well as the deploy-
ment of military infrastructure at our borders,” Putin said in 2014.
Another element of the Kremlin’s narrative is that the current international 
relations landscape has changed favourably for Russia, as the current world order 
is no longer dominated by the United States. Therefore, in what Moscow sees as a 
post-West world (or the declining liberal order), Russia should regain its rightful 
position as a global superpower.
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These narratives along with an increase in Russian NATO-phobic rhetoric have 
several explanations. According to Vasile Rotaru (a 2019 Parnership for Peace Fel-
low at NATO Defense College) they include what Moscow calls “the expansion” 
of NATO towards Russia’s borders, “Moscow’s perception of being a ‘besieged 
fortress’, the Kremlin’s need for both a scapegoat for its foreign policy failures and 
an impetus to rally the population around the flag; a strategy to secure the annexa-
tion of Crimea and to consolidate Russia’s foreign policy positions”.
In the clash of narratives between Russia and NATO states, Moscow has clearly 
gained an upper hand. Russian success stems not only from the fact that, as an au-
tocratic state and unitary actor in international relations, it has been able to send 
When Macron stated that NATO is brain dead, Russian officials praised him, calling 
his words “golden” and “… an exact definition of the current state of NATO”.
Photo: World Economic Forum / Sikarin Thanachaiary (CC) commons.wikimedia.org
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a much clearer and coherent message than the Alliance; but also because NATO 
states do not have a single narrative, or rather counter-narrative: they have diverg-
ing and often competing perceptions of Moscow’s role in international relations. 
Those competing narratives within the transatlantic alliance do not come from the 
weakness of NATO, as some of the critics have argued, but from the sheer num-
ber of member states, diversity of interests and visions they bring. Nevertheless 
the problem of different competing narratives has been used by Moscow to drive 
a wedge between the allies.
And this brings us back to the Russian dimension of Macron’s interview. For 
many leaders in Central and Eastern Europe the most controversial part was not 
necessarily about NATO’s inability to act, but rather about the French president’s 
call for Europe to rethink its relations with Russia. Nothing reinforces Poland’s 
scepticism towards a European security framework more than the idea of appeas-
ing Moscow, as articulated by Paris or (lately not that often) Berlin. Needless to 
say Russia is here to stay and the need to have communication with Moscow that 
can, at some point, turn into dialogue is a necessity. States that neighbour Russia 
would be first to admit that. Yet talks do not equal concessions – especially if a 
concession at hand would have to be a silent consent of the West and accept that 
Crimea is now a Russian territory.
Even though this might be a fact of life, Crimea, legally speaking, is still part of 
Ukraine. By accepting Russia’s fait accompli, western powers would virtually reward 
the Kremlin’s aggressive actions that would in turn send a terrible message – namely, 
that the territorial integrity of (European) states is up for re-negotiation. Therefore, 
few should be surprised that Central and Eastern European and the Baltic states are 
wary of the situation where European powers would make a deal with Russia to go 
back to business as usual. Particularly, if this potential rapprochement with Russia 
would coincide with diminishing US security presence in Europe. For NATO and 
European security that would be a strategic blunder.
Competing intra-NATO narratives… and Moscow’s gains
As the heated discussions within NATO indicate, there were a number of nar-
ratives that shaped the transatlantic debate and the question of European security. 
Here, let us concentrate on four of the most predominant ones*.
 * I cite the first three narratives from Justyna Gotkowska’s recent article, published by the Centre 
for Eastern Studies: https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2019-12-04/nato-
transition.
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First, the Western European narrative, introduced and promoted by France, 
and also quite popular in Germany, concentrates on the assumption that, since the 
United States is mostly preoccupied with competition with China and engaged in 
the Asia-Pacific region, the Americans are withdrawing their military and political 
commitments from Europe. As a result, the transatlantic Alliance might not be the 
best tool for European defence and security.
Second, the current American narrative emphasises global overstretch of the 
United States, intensely signalling that Washington cannot, and will not, solve all 
the security problems that European NATO member states are facing, while, at the 
same time, maintaining its strategic posture vis-à-vis China. Therefore, from this 
vantage point, European allies should become more self-dependent in providing 
their own security, which requires an increase in military spending within NATO 
Europe (the famous two per cent of GDP threshold).
Third is a narrative of the eastern flank states that emphasises an ongoing threat 
from Russia and the necessity of countering it through NATO; or even better, 
via bilateral security arrangements with the United States. In this view, NATO 
is indeed an important part of European security architecture, but mostly if it is 
able to “keep the Americans in”. As long as the United States stands strong within 
the Alliance, NATO proves its value and utility as a defence pact. By adopting a 
similar logic, one of the worst-case scenarios from the perspective of the eastern 
flank states, would be a situation where an adversary decides to test NATO’s col-
lective defence by pursuing an unconventional (i.e. cyber; paramilitary) attack on 
one of its members. For Central Europe and the Baltic states, future interpretations 
of what constitutes an attack under Article 5 are much more than a red herring.
And finally, the southern flank states adopted a narrative that argues that most 
of today’s threats to European security come from the Middle East, North Africa 
and Sahel. In contrast to the previous narrative, this one advocates a focus on ad-
dressing immigration, the refugee crisis, and the rise of violent non-state actors 
(including ISIS). From this perspective, the United States, with its inconsistent 
polices in those regions, is not entirely seen as stability-bringing and NATO is 
viewed as a welcomed force, provided it can address the issues of the southern 
flank (and after intervention in Libya, that proposition is highly contested).
Not good news
Each of these narratives, in themselves, constitutes a by-product of a clash 
in national interests and different geopolitical realities. Each of them has caused 
some stir within the Alliance. But most importantly, the Kremlin has used them 
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to discredit NATO and diminish the security of European member states. When 
Macron stated that NATO is brain dead (referring to the lack of strategic com-
munication between the US and other members), Russian officials praised him, 
calling his words “golden” and “… an exact definition of the current state of NATO.”
Furthermore, a potential American withdrawal from Europe (and potentially 
from NATO) would be a gift for Putin and Russia’s position in international rela-
tions. The Kremlin has repeatedly singled out NATO as a threat to Russian secu-
rity. NATO, without the Americans in Europe, would virtually mean no NATO 
at all. This is why Russian officials praise President 
Trump every time he criticises NATO or hints that a 
withdrawal might be contemplated.
With regards to the eastern flank narrative, the Rus-
sian official response has been consistent for the past 
two decades, implying that countries like Poland and 
Romania dwell on Russophobia and warmongering, 
and that the Baltic states are oppressing the Russian 
minorities and thus obstructing one of Putin’s sacred 
rhetorical elements: “defending Russian people abroad”. 
Putin’s latest rhetorical attack on Poland and its alleged role in starting the Second 
World War is not only an attempt to discredit Poland but more broadly an exam-
ple of Kremlin’s narrative to target one of the NATO members. Given the lack of 
a strong unified response from the European allies, so far it seems like Moscow 
has succeeded.
In the southern flank of NATO, a Russian counter-narrative has also been heard. 
Putin interpreted the Arab Uprisings, and particularly NATO’s intervention in 
Libya, as an impulse to re-engage with the Middle East and North Africa. Accord-
ing to the Kremlin, Russia is much better suited to solve problems in the region 
since it is “impartial” and does not seek to change non-democratic regimes there, 
unlike the western powers. The obvious benefits for Moscow of such an approach 
towards NATO’s southern flank were visible in Russia’s relations with Turkey, Syria 
and Libya. Moreover, Russia has exploited the lack of a coherent western policy 
in the region to become the leading political and diplomatic force there; a power 
that would participate in all major negotiations, thus boosting its credibility as an 
“independent global power”.
As each country within NATO is sovereign, they can pursue their foreign policy 
independently, which includes the ability to sustain bilateral relations with other 
states in a manner they see fit. Yet it seems undeniably risky for the Alliance and 
European security to send mixed signals about the main strategic direction vis-à-
vis the Kremlin’s policies.
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While NATO has been doing a sufficient job of deterring Russia and reassur-
ing allies after 2014, some of the member states have decided to pursue warmer 
relations with Russia. In this way, some of Moscow’s perceptions of NATO and 
the West have been validated: but even though we might live in a post-West and 
post-liberal world order, diffusion of transatlantic unity is by no means good news 
for Europe and its security. While avoiding escalation and establishing a working 
relationship with Russia should be one of NATO and the EU’s top priorities, even 
more central should be the goal of keeping both the transatlantic and European 
projects alive – as they, not the Kremlin, have been, and will remain, guarantors 
of prosperity and security for the whole Euro-Atlantic realm. 
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